PHP Security Release (November 19, 2026): Critical Vulnerabilities and Recommended Actions
The PHP project shipped security releases for all supported branches today, November 19, 2026. If you run PHP in production, plan to upgrade this week. PHP 8.5.13 alone fixes 18 CVEs, several of which can lead to remote code execution (RCE). The issues rated CRITICAL require either non-default configuration or uncommon setups.
The headline issue is CVE-2026-115560, a session serializer mismatch that turns PHP's session upload progress feature into an RCE vector. PHP first warned about it on October 23, less than a week after the PHP2Shell vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619) were exploited in the wild. The October patches for PHP2Shell do not fix CVE-2026-115560.
| Severity | Critical (highest-rated issue in the release) |
| Status | Patches available as of November 19, 2026 |
| Headline CVE | CVE-2026-115560 (GHSA-658j-r8rw-q6mx) |
| Total CVEs fixed in 8.5.13 | 18 |
| Public PoC | Yes, for CVE-2026-115560 (published on GitHub October 24) |
| Exploited in the wild | No reports for CVE-2026-115560 yet; PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109619) is in CISA KEV |
The good news: PHP says the critical issues require non-default configurations or uncommon setups, and disabling session upload progress blocks CVE-2026-115560. The bad news: the official advisory shows the session bug reaches further than October's notice suggested. It can affect servers where separate apps, PHP-FPM pools, or virtual hosts share session storage with different serializer settings, which is common in shared hosting.
Affected and fixed versions
Every supported PHP branch is affected. Upgrade to the fixed release for the branch you run:
| Branch | Vulnerable | Fixed in | Support status |
|---|---|---|---|
| PHP 8.5 | 8.5.12 and earlier | 8.5.13 | Active support |
| PHP 8.4 | 8.4.27 and earlier | 8.4.28 | Security fixes |
| PHP 8.3 | 8.3.36 and earlier | 8.3.37 | Security fixes |
| PHP 8.2 | 8.2.35 and earlier | 8.2.36 | Security fixes until December 31, 2026 |
| PHP 8.1 and older | All | No upstream fix | End of life |
A few notes for hosting teams:
- PHP 8.6.0 also went GA today. It is a feature release that includes the same security fixes, but treat it as a separate project. Don't mix a major upgrade into an emergency patch window.
- PHP 8.2 reaches end of life on December 31, 2026. This is likely one of its last security releases.
- PHP 8.1 and older get nothing from the PHP project. Check with your distribution or LTS vendor for backports.
- Packages lag upstream. On release morning, the official
phpDocker image had no tags for the fixed versions yet, and distribution packages usually land a few days after upstream. Use the workarounds below until they arrive.
What was fixed
The release closes 17 PHP security advisories plus a bundled uriparser library update. Most require a specific configuration to exploit, so the real question for any server is: does my setup match the preconditions?
CVE-2026-115560: Session serializer mismatch (RCE)
This is the issue PHP pre-announced on October 23. The full PHP security advisory, published with today's releases, describes it as a configuration-dependent deserialization issue, separate from the PHP2Shell stale global state bug (CVE-2026-109619). It affects PHP 8.2 through 8.5, and PHP says older unsupported releases may also be affected.
How it works
Session upload progress runs while PHP parses a multipart upload, before any application code. It stores attacker-controlled data, such as the uploaded file name, in a session key using the php_binary or php_serialize serializer. If the same session is later read with the php serializer, bytes inside that key can be passed to the unserializer and turned into PHP objects. With a suitable gadget chain in the reading application, that becomes remote code execution.
Two things must happen:
- Session upload progress is enabled, and an attacker can submit a multipart upload to a context that uses
php_binaryorphp_serialize. - A later or concurrent operation reads the same stored session, with the same session ID, using the
phpserializer.
Where the mismatch comes from. October's notice described one path: an application changes session.serialize_handler to php with ini_set() before session_start(). The advisory makes clear that a runtime change is not required. The mismatch can also arise between:
- Separate applications on the same server, such as a legacy app and a newer one
- PHP-FPM pools (separate pools don't automatically get separate session storage)
- Virtual hosts
- Command-line processes, such as cron jobs or workers
In each case, the trigger is two contexts with different fixed INI settings reading and writing the same session data, whether through a shared session.save_path directory or a shared Redis or Memcached backend. Workers that use the same serializer don't create the mismatch.
This matters for hosting. A single site that never touches ini_set() can still be exposed if it shares session storage with something configured differently.
What the fix changes:
- Session upload progress is now disabled by default.
- While upload progress is enabled, PHP rejects runtime changes to session settings, including
session.serialize_handler. - An explicit
session.upload_progress.enabled=1overrides the new default. The fix does not enforce matching serializers across separate configurations. If you keep upload progress on, it's on you to ensure every app, pool, vhost, and CLI process that shares session data uses the same serializer.
Other notable fixes
| CVE | Component | Severity | Impact | Preconditions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-129289 | PHP-FPM | Critical (9.2) | Request smuggling leading to code execution; affects 8.2–8.5 | FastCGI connection reuse at the front end (nginx fastcgi_keep_conn on, Apache enablereuse=on, some HAProxy or LiteSpeed setups) and an app that opens php://input without reading it fully. Present since PHP 5.6. |
| CVE-2026-126714 | Session | Critical (9.2) | Partially written session files mix two sessions' data, which PHP may unpack as objects (RCE); affects 8.2–8.5 | Default file-based sessions; attacker must influence session data, interrupt the write, and find a gadget chain |
| CVE-2026-129496 | Date | Critical (9.2) | Timezone cache use-after-free (RCE); affects 8.2–8.5 | A startup warning written to a PHP error log, then an early request warning in a fresh worker |
| CVE-2026-129474 | Core | Critical (9.2) | Use-after-free in __call()/__callStatic() backtraces (RCE); PHP 8.5 only | zend.exception_ignore_args=0; the production php.ini sets it to 1 |
| CVE-2026-129182 | Core | Critical (9.2) | Use-after-free after shutdown; PHP 8.5 only | A fatal error while PHP restores memory-limit or zlib output settings at shutdown. Extends the October PHP2Shell fix. |
| CVE-2026-129481 | Session | Critical (9.2) | Use-after-free after interrupted session shutdown; affects 8.3–8.5 | A fatal error in a callback during session cleanup. Extends the October PHP2Shell fix. |
| CVE-2026-129291 | PHP-FPM | — | Local privilege escalation from a worker to the FPM master, which usually runs as root | catch_workers_output = yes. Matters most on shared hosting. |
| CVE-2026-128090 | Phar | — | Signature bypass: a signed PHAR can be downgraded to a plain hash and still accepted | Signed PHARs loaded from a writable location |
| CVE-2026-129538 | CGI | Moderate | Out-of-bounds read/write in PATH_INFO correction | php-cgi only, with specific path mappings; FPM and mod_php not affected |
| CVE-2026-129292 | PHP-FPM | — | XSS on the status page | FPM status endpoint exposed |
| CVE-2026-128064 | Standard | — | Mixed-case HTTPS:// or FTPS:// URLs can send data in plaintext | Code using such URLs |
The remaining fixes cover a double free in DOM, two SOAP bugs, a session use-after-free, a DoS via folded HTTP headers, and two URI parsing issues. See the PHP 8.5.13 changelog for the full list.
Exploitation status
As of publication, there are no public reports of in-the-wild exploitation of CVE-2026-115560, and it is not in CISA KEV. But exploit code is already public: a proof-of-concept with a Docker lab appeared on GitHub on October 24, one day after PHP's informational notice. The author reports end-to-end command execution against php:8.4.27-apache (fully patched for PHP2Shell) using the ini_set() path, and others have documented command execution with Guzzle and Monolog gadget chains, both common in PHP applications. Here is why we're not waiting:
- PHP2Shell showed how fast this moves. Attackers probed CVE-2026-109619 starting October 17, before the October 21 patch. A confirmed RCE on an Apache mod_php 8.4.26 honeypot followed on October 24, and CISA added the CVE to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on October 26.
- Patches are a roadmap. Now that fixes are public, the diffs show attackers exactly where to look. Expect exploit development to target the bugs with the most common preconditions first.
- Hosting is the uncommon-setup capital. FastCGI connection reuse,
catch_workers_output, legacy session code that swaps serializers, andphp-cgiare all more common in shared and managed hosting than in a typical single-app deployment.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Nov 19, 2026 | PHP releases 8.5.13, 8.4.28, 8.3.37, 8.2.36 (and 8.6.0 GA) and publishes the full advisory for CVE-2026-115560 |
| Nov 18, 2026 | PHP pre-announces a critical security release for all supported branches |
| Oct 26, 2026 | CVE-2026-109619 (PHP2Shell) added to CISA KEV |
| Oct 24, 2026 | PHP2Shell RCE confirmed on a mod_php honeypot; public PoC for CVE-2026-115560 published on GitHub |
| Oct 23, 2026 | PHP publishes an informational advisory for CVE-2026-115560 and recommends disabling session upload progress |
| Oct 21, 2026 | PHP fixes PHP2Shell in 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, 8.2.35 |
| Oct 17, 2026 | First PHP2Shell exploitation attempts observed in honeypots |
Recommended actions
1. Patch
Upgrade every PHP version that serves websites to 8.5.13, 8.4.28, 8.3.37, or 8.2.36, or to a distribution package that lists these CVEs as fixed. Don't forget secondary runtimes: control panels, webmail, and phpMyAdmin often use their own PHP binary.
If you skipped the October releases, you are also still exposed to PHP2Shell, which is actively exploited. Today's releases fix both.
2. Apply workarounds until you can patch
Disable session upload progress (CVE-2026-115560). Set it where it applies before request parsing:
; php.ini or Apache mod_php config
session.upload_progress.enabled = 0
; PHP-FPM pool config
php_admin_flag[session.upload_progress.enabled] = offDon't rely on ini_set() or .user.ini for this setting. Then restart (not reload) all PHP workers, and confirm the value on the serving SAPI with php-fpm -i or a phpinfo() page, not the CLI. If you already disabled upload progress in October for PHP2Shell, leave it off. After patching, it stays off by default, so also search your configs for any explicit session.upload_progress.enabled = 1, which overrides the new safe default.
Check the other preconditions:
- FastCGI connection reuse (CVE-2026-129289): turn off
fastcgi_keep_connin nginx orenablereusein Apache until patched. catch_workers_output = yes(CVE-2026-129291): disable it in FPM pools, especially on shared hosting.- PHP 8.5 backtraces (CVE-2026-129474): set
zend.exception_ignore_args=1(the production default) orfatal_error_backtraces=0. - FPM status page (CVE-2026-129292): restrict it to trusted IPs.
3. Audit code and session configuration
Search for runtime serializer switches:
grep -rn "session.serialize_handler" --include=*.php /path/to/sitesAny ini_set('session.serialize_handler', 'php') before session_start() is a red flag. Standardize the handler in configuration instead.
A clean grep isn't enough, though. The advisory confirms the mismatch can also come from fixed INI settings, so audit configuration too:
- Map every session store. For each
session.save_pathdirectory and each Redis or Memcached session backend, list every app, PHP-FPM pool, vhost, and CLI job that reads or writes it. - Compare serializers. Check the effective
session.serialize_handlerfor each of those contexts (php.ini, pool configs, vhostphp_admin_value, CLI php.ini). They must all match. - Separate what doesn't need to share. Give each pool or site its own
session.save_pathunless sharing is intentional.
# Find serializer and save_path settings across PHP and FPM configs
grep -rnE "session\.(serialize_handler|save_path|upload_progress\.enabled)" /etc/php* /etc/httpd /etc/apache2 /etc/nginx 2>/dev/null4. Watch for post-exploitation
Patching closes the door, but it doesn't tell you whether someone already walked through it. Monitor for web workers (php-fpm, php-cgi, apache2, httpd, lsphp) spawning shells or downloaders, and for new PHP files appearing in upload, cache, and session directories.
For hosting providers
- Inventory every PHP version across your fleet, including EOL branches.
- Push the session upload progress workaround fleet-wide today; it has little impact on most sites and it becomes the default once you patch.
- Check whether FPM pools or vhosts share a
session.save_pathor session backend. Separate pools don't get separate session storage automatically, and different serializer settings across them are enough to expose every site on that store. - Review FPM pool templates for
catch_workers_outputand front-end proxy configs for FastCGI connection reuse. - Roll out upstream or vendor packages as they land, prioritizing shared hosting servers.
- Notify customers on PHP 8.1 and older, and those on 8.2 ahead of its December 31 EOL.
How Monarx helps
To be clear: Monarx does not replace patching. These are memory-safety and logic bugs inside PHP itself, and upgrading PHP is the only complete fix.
What Monarx does is cover the gap between disclosure and patch, and catch what happens after a successful exploit. An RCE in PHP is only the first step. Attackers use it to drop webshells, backdoors, and malicious PHP that keeps them on the server long after the bug is closed. That is where ThreatShield works:
- Runtime protection: ThreatShield watches PHP as it executes and blocks malicious code before it runs, including webshells and droppers delivered through an exploit.
- Detection and cleanup: Our engine detects malicious and obfuscated PHP files across the server and can remove or quarantine them automatically.
- Visibility for hosting partners: Our Threat Research team monitors signals across our partner network and ships new detections as exploitation patterns emerge.
If you're a hosting provider and want to protect your customers' sites while you roll out patches, contact us to learn how ThreatShield works with your platform.
Conclusion
This release is less dramatic than PHP2Shell, since PHP says every critical issue needs a non-default or uncommon setup. But hosting environments are full of uncommon setups, and October showed attackers can go from patch to exploitation in days. Patch this week, apply the workarounds today, and keep an eye out for signs of compromise.
We'll update this advisory as exploitation details or new guidance emerge.
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